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ABSTRACT 
 
There are three ways to manage earnings. That is accruals, real, and shifting. The 
famous method to manage earnings is accruals and real. Usually, real activities 
manipulation is conducted on the going of period. The action will increase the loss for 
the firms at the end of period. To avoid the loss, managers will manage earnings through 
accruals (discretionary accruals). Therefore, the objective of this study is to investigate 
whether real activities manipulation positively influences accruals earnings management. 
To investigate the issue, this study collected data from Indonesian Stock Exchange. 
Samples of this study are the manufacturing companies. There are 195 firm year from 
2003 to 2007. The results of this study support research hypothesis that real activities 
manipulation positively influence accruals earnings management. The higher real 
activities manipulation effects higher accruals earnings management at the end of period.  
 
 
 
Keywords:  
earnings management, real activities manipulation and accruals earnings management. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 3rd Accounting & The 2nd Doctoral Colloquium  
Bridging the Gap between Theory, Research, and Practice:  
IFRS Convergence and Application 
Faculty of Economics Universitas Indonesia 
Bali‐Indonesia, 27 ‐ 28 October 2010 
 
 
Organized by : 
Department of  Accounting FEUI 
Center For Accounting Development FEUI     
Post Graduate Program in Accounting FEUI 
Master in Accounting Program FEUI     
Profession Education Program in Accounting FEUI  
 
1. Introduction 
Earnings management has become a common phenomenon occurring in various 
countries including Indonesia. One interesting phenomenon in Indonesia is a case about 
inflating Kimia Farma’s profits made by the management of PT Kimia Farma Tbk in 
financial statement for fiscal year 2001. This markup is known in the year 2002. This 
condition was discovered by a public accountant Hans Tuanakotta and Mustofa in the first 
time. The management makes irregularities in the financial statements in the first half of 
2001. The value of inflating profit is Rp32,7 billion. The profits should be   Rp99,6 billion 
while reported earnings is Rp132,3 billion with net sales is Rp1,42 trillion. 
This phenomenon indicates that manipulation of the financial statement is still 
possible to be conducted by managers. Following definition of Healy and Wahlen (1999) 
that earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and 
in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders 
about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers. 
According to Hendriksen dan Bredan (1992), earnings are as a measurement of 
efficiency. The efficient operation of an enterprise affects both the current dividend stream 
and the use of the invested capital for providing a future dividend stream. Therefore, all 
equity holders are interested in the efficiency of management. The present equity holders 
can take the necessary steps to obtain a new management if the present management is not 
operating efficiently. They may also provide for incentives or bonuses to efficient 
managements. Prospective stockholders will attempt to evaluate the efficiency of 
management before investing or placing a value on the stock of the firm. A measurement of 
The 3rd Accounting & The 2nd Doctoral Colloquium  
Bridging the Gap between Theory, Research, and Practice:  
IFRS Convergence and Application 
Faculty of Economics Universitas Indonesia 
Bali‐Indonesia, 27 ‐ 28 October 2010 
 
 
Organized by : 
Department of  Accounting FEUI 
Center For Accounting Development FEUI     
Post Graduate Program in Accounting FEUI 
Master in Accounting Program FEUI     
Profession Education Program in Accounting FEUI  
 
the efficiency of the firm provides a basis for decisions. Therefore, earnings will be 
managed by managers to inform the outside investor that the firm’s performance is good.  
Earnings are managed by managers because it is very important information for the 
internal and external users. Earnings management is not violate the existing regulations and 
generally accepted accounting principles. However, earnings management can be 
detrimental the information of financial statements. Earnings are managed by managers 
through accrual, real activities, and shifting of core expense. Usually, real activities 
manipulation is conducted on going period. Roychowdhury (2006) defines real activities 
manipulation as differences in the activities of normal operational. Manipulation of real 
activities can be most extensively through price discounts and reduce discretionary 
expenses to meet earnings targets. 
According to Davidson et al. (1987), earnings management is a process of taking 
deliberate steps within the constraints of generally accepted accounting principles desired 
to bring about a level of reported earnings. Based on this definition, Sugiri (1999) 
concluded that management can play a role in accrual components. Earnings management 
in this narrow sense is the behavior of management to play with the discretionary accrual 
component to determine high or low the earnings. Earnings are potentially managed 
because financial accounting standards still provide alternatives method. 
Accruals are a tool to manage earnings at the end of the period. While, real 
activities manipulation is a tool to manage earnings on a going period. Accruals may be 
chosen to avoid loss affected by real activities. Therefore, this study investigates whether 
influence accrual manipulation of real activities (accounting) earnings management. 
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The rest of this paper is organized as follow section 2 presents theoretical and 
hypothesis development. Section 3 discusses research methods.  Section 4 reports the 
empirical results and Section 5 concludes the result of this research. 
 
2. Hypothesis Development 
2. 1. Positive Accounting Theory and Earnings Management 
 Positive accounting theory is based on agency theory used to explain and predict 
accounting choices by managers. Opportunities for the contracting parties can influence 
accounting choices because accounting numbers is a control mechanism in the agency 
relationship. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) implied agency theory to explain and predict 
the behavior of management relating to the selection of accounting procedures. Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986) explained three hypotheses as bonus plan, debt covenant, and political 
cost.  
a. Bonus plan hypothesis. Cateris paribus, managers of firms with the bonus plans are 
more likely to choose accounting procedures that shift reported earnings from 
future periods to current period. 
The parameters of bonus plans are set such that bonuses are awarded in most years. If a 
bonus can be awarded, the maximum amount is a positive linier function of reported 
earnings. This led that manager’s compensation under a bonus plan increase as reported 
earnings increase. 
b. Debt/equity hypothesis. Cateris paribus, the larger a firm’s debt/equity ratio, the 
most likely the firm’s manager is to select accounting procedures that shift reported 
earnings from future periods to the current period. 
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The debt/equity hypothesis can be derived from the hypothesis based on the debt covenants 
that the closer a firm is to a particular restrictive accounting based covenant the more likely 
the manager is to use procedures that increase current earnings. 
c. Size hypothesis. Ceteris paribus, the larger the firm, the more likely the manager is 
to choose accounting procedures that defer reported earnings from current to future 
periods. 
Accounting researcher has used firm size to proxy for a firm’s political sensitivity and thus 
the incentive of managers to choose earnings reducing accounting procedures. The 
hypothesis is based on the assumption that large firms are more politically sensitive and 
have relatively larger wealth transfers imposed on them than smaller firms. 
2. 2. Earnings Management by Discretionary Accruals  
Accruals earnings management is tool to manage earnings through the choice of 
accounting methods adopted by the generally accepted accounting principles. Motivation 
of managers to manage earnings (Healy and Wahlen, 1999; and Scott, 2006) provided 
empirically by several researchers. Motivation bonuses provided empirically by Healy 
(1985), Gaver et al. (1995), Holthausen et al. (1995), and Guidry et al. (1999). Other 
contractual motivation is provided by Sweeney (1994), DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994). 
Political motivation is provided by Jones (1991), Cahan (1992), Na'im and Hartono (1996), 
Key (1997), and Navissi (1999). Dopuch and Pincus (1988) provided the tax motivations. 
CEO turnover is provided empirically by DeFond and Park (1997). Capital market 
motivations is provided empirical by Perry and Williams (1994), Teoh et al. (1998a), Teoh 
et al. (1998b), Rangan (1998), and Erickson and Wang (1999). In these studies, the 
accruals method is selected by managers to manage earnings. 
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2. 3. Earnings Management by Real Activities Manipulation  
Real activities manipulation is a tool to manage earnings through the choice to 
change the time or the structure of an operating, investing and/or financial transaction to 
affect output accounting system. Managers also have opportunity to manage earnings by 
manipulation of real activities. Manipulation of real activities affects the cash flow and 
accruals such as decrease the amount of research and development costs (Baber et al., 
1991; Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Bartov, 1993; Bushee, 1998; Bens et al., 2002, 2003). 
Healy and Wahlen (1999), Fudenberg and Tirole (1995), and Dechow and Skinner (2000) 
focused on accelerating sales, delivering schedule, delaying research and development 
activities, and restricting on spending as earnings management methods. They are available 
for managers to manipulate the activities of real. 
Roychowdhury (2006) defines real activities manipulation as differences in normal 
activities. Manipulation of real activities can be most extensively through price discounts 
and reduce discretionary expenses to meet earnings targets. The survey results of Bruns and 
Merchant (1990) and Graham et al. (2005) indicates that financial executives are more 
interested in manipulating earnings through real activities than accruals to meet earnings 
targets. This is happened; first, the manipulation of accruals tends to attract an auditor or a 
regulator to supervise than a real decision. Second, accrual manipulation causes a risk than 
the manipulation of real activities. 
Manipulation of real activities can reduce the value of the company, because this 
activities have a negative effect on cash flow on the next period. Aggressive price 
discounts increase sales volumes caused the customers expect a discount in future periods. 
This led to sales margins would come to be lower. Volume increased causing excessive 
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production (overproduction). The result is that there is excess supply that must be sold in 
subsequent periods. This causes the greater inventory holding cost. 
Real activities manipulation and accruals earnings management have different 
characteristics. Accruals earnings management has not consequence on the cash flows 
directly. While, real activities manipulation has consequence on high cost of cash flow. 
However, it does not restrict managers to use continually real activities manipulation to 
manage earnings. According to Roychowdury (2006), managers do not like the use only 
accrual earnings management to manage earnings. Auditors easy know the accruals. 
Therefore, the accruals are more risk if managers use only accruals to manage earnings. 
Earnings must be managed to meet level of desired earnings. This condition encourages 
managers to manage earnings thought real and accrual. They are) are complementary to 
manage earnings. 
Generally, managers determine the level of accruals earnings management after 
determining the level of real activities manipulation (Matsuura, 2008). Real activities 
manipulation is conducted during the period.  While, accruals earnings management is 
conducted at the end of the period. The characteristic encourages managers to manage 
earnings through real activities manipulation and accruals earnings management 
complementary to achieve threshold earnings. Real and accruals are also conducted to 
make stabile earnings. For example, PT X has a negative income (income actually smaller 
than expected earnings). Managers will increase earnings to meet expected earnings. The 
strategy is conducted to increase sales by providing limited discount. The discount is one of 
the real activities manipulation techniques. Discounts will encourage consumers to buy 
firm’s products. Total sales will increase.  
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However, PT X can not continue to give discounts. After achievement to expected 
level of earnings, the discounted does not continue. The discounts will cause PT X’s loss. 
In addition, the granting of discounts time to time in one year can also reduce consumer’s 
image. The consumers will consider the bad quality of the products. When the discount is 
stopped, the firm’s profit will decline. Manager PT X would try to profit levels have been 
achieved can be maintained. Therefore, at the end of the year the managers will use the 
using other methods to increase profit. That is accruals earnings management. Managers 
reduce reserve for bad debt to maintain level earnings consistently.  In the end, sum of 
earnings is the same as sum of expected earnings.  
Based on the example, managers use real and accruals complementary. Managers 
use real and then managers use accrual to manage earnings. Real and accruals are used 
sequentially. Real activities manipulation encourages managers to conduct accruals 
earnings management. This study expects that real activities manipulation positively 
influence accrual earnings management. Therefore, this study hypothesizes as follow. 
H1: Real activities manipulation positively influences accruals earnings management. 
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3. Research Method 
3. 1. Data 
The 49 samples are collected by purposive sampling. There are criterions as 
follows.  
1. The manufacturing companies are listed at Indonesian Stock Exchange from 
January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2007. They have to publish financial reporting from 
2003 until 2007. 
2. The companies have data completely on financial statement. 
3. The companies have 12 months accounting period. 
Type of data in this study is secondary data. Data are collected from database the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) from 2003-2007 and Indonesian Capital Market 
Directory (ICMD).  
3. 2. Definition and Measurement Variables  
Real activities manipulation is indicated by discretional cash flow operating 
activities. An example of operating cash flow is interest and tax payment receipts. 
Discretional cash flow operating activities are carried out to catch the real activities of 
managers to manage earnings. The researchers calculated that real is discretional cash flow 
from operating activities as a residual model Roychowdhury (2006). The formula is as 
follows.  
CFO it = a 0 + a 1 SALE it + a 2 Δ SALE it + ε it 
Where: 
CFO: Cash flows from operating activities, divided by total assets beginning of period  
SALE: sales that year, divided by total assets beginning of period  
Δ SALE: changes in annual sales, divided by total assets beginning of period  
The 3rd Accounting & The 2nd Doctoral Colloquium  
Bridging the Gap between Theory, Research, and Practice:  
IFRS Convergence and Application 
Faculty of Economics Universitas Indonesia 
Bali‐Indonesia, 27 ‐ 28 October 2010 
 
 
Organized by : 
Department of  Accounting FEUI 
Center For Accounting Development FEUI     
Post Graduate Program in Accounting FEUI 
Master in Accounting Program FEUI     
Profession Education Program in Accounting FEUI  
 
ε: regression residual (proxy real activities manipulation) 
 
Accruals earnings management is indicated by discretional accruals. Discretional 
accruals is calculated using Jones' model (1991). This model is widely used in these studies 
because the estimation of discretional accounting accruals are also entering the amount of 
nondiscretional accruals. This study measures the discretional accruals (proxy accruals 
earnings management) as a residual model of Jones. The formula is as follow. 
TACC it = b 0 + b 1 PPE it + b 2 Δ SALE it + ζ it 
Where: 
TACC: total accruals, it is different between cash flows from operating activities with net 
profit after tax, divided by total assets at the beginning of period  
PPE: gross property, plant, equipment at the beginning period and divide total asset on the 
beginning period. 
Δ SALE: changes in annual sales, divided by total assets beginning of period  
ζ: regression residual (proxy for accruals earnings management) 
 
This research uses three control variables in this study, namely, leverage, size and, 
and firm’s growth. Control variables are used to control the causal relationship model in 
order to get a more complete empirical model (Jogiyanto, 2010). The argument of this 
study use three control variables is related to positive accounting theory. The theory 
suggests three motivations to manage earnings. That is debt covenant hypothesis 
(leverage), political cost hypothesis (size), and bonus plan hypothesis (firm’s growth). 
1. Debt to equity ratio is the ratio of debt to equity at the end of the year.  
2. Firm’s size is the natural logarithm of total assets at end of period.  
3. Firm’s growth is the change in sales.  
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Generally, real activities manipulation is occurred before accruals earnings 
management. Therefore, this study determines unexpected income before accruals earnings 
management PreAEMUI (Matsuura, 2008). PreAEMUI is unexpected income before 
accruals earnings management.  
Pre AEMUI it = UI it - AEM it 
Next, to test the hypothesis, an empirical model is as follows: 
AEMit = δ0+δ1 PreAEMUIit+δ2RAMit+δ3 LEVit+δ4 SZit+δ5GROWTHit+ψit 
Where, 
AEM: Accruals earnings management. 
PreAEMUI: unexpected income before accruals earnings management. 
RAM: Real activities manipulation. 
LEV: Leverage. 
SZ: Size. 
GROWTH: Firm’s growth. 
4. Results 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive Statistics
196 -.31 .33 .0000 .08670
196 -5.58 3.86 .0886 .93174
196 -5.50 3.81 .0886 .91531
196 -.38 .33 .0000 .10607
196 .05 10.93 1.0765 1.08627
196 24.05 31.78 27.5615 1.54517
196 -1.00 1.47 .1693 .23451
196
AEM
PreAEMUI
PreEMUI
REM
DE
SIZE
GROWTH
Valid N (listwise)
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
 
The results is real activities manipulation positively influence accruals earnings 
management. Therefore, H1 is supported.  
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Table 2. the Results of Analysis 
Model 1: AEMit=δ0+δ1 PreAEMUIit+δ2RAMit+δ3 LEVit+δ4 SZit+δ5GROWTHit+ψit 
Variabel Koefisien t-statistik Nilai-p 
Constant -.079 -.719 .473
PreAEMUI -.015 -2.239 .026**
RAM .223 3.950 .000***
LEV -.009 -1.547 .124
SZ .003 .759 .449
GROWTH .037 1.417 .158
 
 
Adjusted R2 .102
F-statistik 5.424
Probabilitas F-statistik .0000
N 195
***, **, *= statistic significan at alpha  1%, 5%, and 10%.   
 
The results support Matsuura (2008). Real activities manipulation occurs when 
managers change the time or the structure of operating, investing, and financial transactions 
to affect output accounting system. The real is chosen to manage earnings throughout the 
running period. If managers conduct real to manage earnings at the end of the period, it is 
very risky. Because has consequences on cash flow. Meanwhile, accruals earnings 
management is chosen to manage earnings through selecting of accounting methods 
accepted GAAP. Changes in accounting method generally are conducted at the end of the 
period. Therefore, the manager determines the level of accrual earnings management after 
real activities manipulation.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Based on the results real activities manipulation positively influences accruals 
earnings management. It suggests that the increasing of real activities manipulation affect 
the increasing accruals earnings management. Limitation of this research is that real 
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activities manipulation is only measured by cash flow from operating activities. Subsequent 
researcher can use other proxies of real activities manipulation. 
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